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PSB D-19/1

(Revised)

June 19, 1952

Copy No. 19

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

STAFF STUDY

ON

INVENTORY OF INSTRUMENTALITIES

FOR

COUNTERING SOVIET ORBIT BLACKMAIL TACTICS

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INVENTORY OF INSTRUMENTALITIES  
FOR  
COUNTERING SOVIET ORBIT BLACKMAIL TACTICS

I.

PROBLEM

To recommend psychological actions to frustrate Soviet blackmail tactics as illustrated by the Oatis case and the imprisonment of American fliers in Hungary.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Definition

Soviet blackmail tactics are defined as actions by Soviet or satellite governments with the intent to injure the rights, position or prestige of free world countries or their citizens. Such actions are always framed in legality, making it difficult to retaliate effectively without resort to violent or illegal measures. In most cases, it is impossible to devise a countermeasure in the same geographical area and related to the original action.

B. Criteria for Effectiveness of Countermeasures

Countermeasures taken by the free world must either exercise deterrent influence, mitigate psychological consequence of Soviet acts, or exploit the communist action to improve our position in some other way without appearing to create a grayer risk of war than the action against which we retaliate. Even though a particular countermeasure would injure the USSR it should not be employed if it would weaken the U S position with other countries of the free world.

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The best hope of deterrence of Soviet blackmail tactics must be sought in a long-range policy aimed at placing as many burdens as possible upon the Soviet bloc not only in particular cases but also in general. If the free world could thus create a sufficient degree of anti-Soviet harassment, the communist governments might eventually be impelled to abandon their blackmail tactics. Consequently, in any new Soviet blackmail actions against the free world, Western policy should give special attention to exploiting the incident in order to justify additional anti-Soviet harassments. No legitimate pretext or occasion for adding to the backlog of harassment should be neglected, particularly when the cooperation of a number of free nations can be obtained.

There is virtually no countermeasure which the United States can take alone to meet the criteria discussed above. Concerted action by the free world, requiring international agreement in advance, would assure a greater degree of success. Where feasible and appropriate, Western countermeasures should be based upon, or related to, UN action, thus acquiring the legal or psychological force of international sanctions.

The position of the free world would be strengthened by the accumulation of relatively minor harassing actions which produce one or other of the following effects: (1) financial loss to the Soviet government and the government of the satellite involved in the outrage; (2) serious impediment to the work of foreign missions of the two communist governments; and (3) weakening of the psychological position of the Soviet bloc.

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Since the effectiveness of the types of action indicated above depends on continuing them over long periods of time, perhaps years, it is essential, if they are to have any deterrent value, to remove any hope that they can be discontinued short of major concessions by the Soviets. Operating agencies should retain the principle of flexibility so that countermeasures can be taken selectively, called off suddenly and re-applied with the same celerity. Elements of surprise, uncertainty and shock can enhance the value of measures which would normally have only modest effect. The search by the Department of State for countermeasures in the economic, diplomatic and psychological fields should be continued and the effectiveness of actions already taken against Hungary and Czechoslovakia should be assessed with reference to the particular cases involved.

D. Information Campaign

To have the proper effect in the free world as well as the communist world, any countermeasure must receive proper treatment by media of information. Depending upon the circumstances in each case, a countermeasure will be ignored, soft-pedaled, or advertised.

In each case of Soviet blackmail a prosecution brief should be prepared for presentation through all channels to convince world opinion of the injustice of the Soviet action. The information program will strive at all times to discredit communism and enhance the position of the free world even when countermeasures against Soviet blackmail are not in question.

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III.

SOVIET TACTICS AND APPROPRIATE COUNTERMEASURES


A. Categories of Soviet Tactics

1. Invasions of property rights.
2. Deprivation of personal rights.
3. Harassment of U.S. and allied missions behind the Iron Curtain. (It is recognized that the situation in Berlin is unique. Special plans are required for a position of such major strategic importance.)

B. Countermeasures

Before each measure is initiated by the U.S., it should be weighed for its effect upon the Soviets, its reception by the free world, and the scope of probable Soviet retaliation. The following are suggested as examples.

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
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5. Restriction on Soviet propaganda. The issuance of certain publications emanating from official Soviet and satellite sources in the United States and allied countries should be stopped. 2/ Retaliation against U.S. publications in Soviet-dominated countries would be no major loss since they are largely absorbed by the secret police. Under existing U.S. law, this form of action is applicable only to foreign nationals.
  6. Indictment of Soviet Intervention. Marshal all evidence of Soviet direction of communist parties in the free world and use it to conduct a campaign to indict the Soviet government for intervention in foreign countries. Among other things, this would establish a basis for aggressive police action against communist subversion.
- C. Relation of Countermeasures to Specific Soviet Tactics
- If possible, countermeasures should be applied to create an impression of cause and effect in the minds of Soviet policy makers.

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2/ It is not intended to exclude Soviet orbit publications which are of value to students and research organizations.

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1. Soviet invasion of property rights. Financial exclusion, restriction on propaganda, and indictment of Soviet intervention.
2. Violation of personal rights. Restriction of diplomatic missions, harassment of diplomatic missions, restriction on propaganda, and indictment of Soviet intervention.
3. Harassment of U.S. Missions. Harassment of shipping, progressive financial exclusion, restriction of diplomatic missions and harassment of diplomatic missions.

PSB:Office of Plans and Policy

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